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Maryland 
Embraces 
Emotional 
Distress 
by Andrea Gentile 
Although plaintiff Harris did not prevail 
in his case, Jones v. Harris, 35 Md.App. 
556, 371 A.2d 1104 (1977) saw the first 
direct judicial recognition of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress as an inde-
pendent tort in Maryland. 
Harris brought an action for damages 
against Jones and against General Motors 
Corporation alleging that Jones, while in 
the course of his duty as a G.M.C. super-
visor, intentionally mimicked his (Harris') 
speech impediment, attempted to humili-
ate him with snide remarks, and con-
tinued to do so for an extended period of 
time with resulting emotional distress to 
Harris. 
The tort of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress has been recognized for 
a number of years in California, Virginia 
and other jurisdictions. However, as this 
was a case of first impression in Maryland, 
the court first traced "The Interest In 
Freedom From Emotional Distress" from 
the 1934 Restatement of Torts which 
refused to recognize it as an independent 
tort, to PROSSER'S LAW OF TORTS (4th Edi-
tion) where the distinguished dean gave 
recognition to the tort and described its 
boundaries. General recognition of the 
tort was found, said the court, in 64 
A.L.R. 2d 100 (dealing with emotional 
distress) where it is stated that the earlier 
case opinions which disallowed recovery 
for emotional distress alone should be 
treated as dicta. The trend is toward 
allowing recovery when there is severe 
emotional distress caused by an inten-
tionally or recklessly committed, 
unprivileged act of the defendant, which 
was reasonably calculated to cause severe 
emotional distress to the plaintiff. 
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In Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. 
Roch, 160 Md. 189, 153 A. 22 (1931), 
the court allowed damages for emotional 
distress suffered by the plaintiff and 
caused by the defendant's agent's delivery 
of a package containing a dead rat in lieu 
of the requested loaf of bread. The c()Urt 
based its decision on a negligence theory, 
concluding that the agent of the defendant 
had carelessly and negligently performed 
his duty by allowing the rat to be 
substituted for the bread. However, the 
Jones court said that in the Roch case the 
string was " ... quite lightly tied ... " to 
the tort of negligence, and they infer that 
the Roch and Mahnke v Moore, 197 Md. 
61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951) (damages 
allowed where the father of a young child 
forced her to watch him murder her 
mother and then kill himself) were, in 
effect, cases of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. The court concluded 
that the new tort would be viable in Mary-
land in a proper case. 35 Md.App. at 561, 
371 A.2d at 1107. 
The case of Womack v. Eldridge, 215 
Va. 338, 210 S.E.2d 140 (1974) pro-
vided the guidelines used by the Jones 
court to determine when a cause of action 
would lie for emotional distress unaccom-
panied by physical injury. The elements 
outlined by the court are: 
1. The wrongdoer's conduct is inten-
tional or reckless. Womack held 
that, "this element is satisfied where 
the wrongdoer had the specific pur-
pose of inflicting emotional distress 
or where he intended his specific 
conduct and knew or should have 
known that emotional distress 
would likely result." 35 Md. App. at 
569-570, 1371 A.2d at 1108. 
2. The conduct is outrageous to the 
extent that it offends the generally 
accepted standards of decency and 
morality. 
3. There is a causal connection be-
tween the wrongdoer's actions and 
the emotional distress. 
4. The emotional distress must be 
severe. 
Harris provided testimony from a co-
worker as to Jones' conduct toward Har-
ris, and it was probably based on that 
testimony that the court found that the 
first two elements were clearly met in the 
instant case. However, there was no evi-
dence presented to show a causal connec-
tion between Jones' alleged harrassment 
and Harris' emotional distress. Testimony 
by Harris' wife pointed out that Harris' 
problems started at least seven months 
prior to the time Jones began his harrass-
ment. Emotional distrurbance could be in-
ferred by Mrs. Harris' testimony that in 
November, 1974 he was drinking heavily 
and threw a meat platter at her. Finally 
Harris' own testimony tended to refute his 
allegation of causal connection between 
his emotional disturbance and Jones' har-
rassment. He stated that he began seeking 
medical attention for his problems six 
years prior to this case. 
With no evidence to support the third 
and fourth elements of the tort, Harris 
could not prevail. But the tort of inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress is 
now alive in Maryland. Be kind to neigh-
bors and co-workers. 
Solicitation 
Broadened 
by John Jeffrey Ross 
Of no small consequence in local crimi-
nal jurisprudence is D.C. Code §22-2701, 
popularly known as the "solicitation 
statute" : 
It shall not be lawful for any person to 
invite, entice, persuade, or to address 
for the purpose of inviting, enticing, 
persuading, any person or persons six-
teen years of age or over in the District 
of Columbia, for the purpose of prosti-
tution, or any other immoral or lewd 
purpose ... 
Nearly six percent of the arrests in the 
District of Columbia in 1975 were for 
commercial sex crimes and over 1100 of 
these were prosecuted by the U.S. At-
torney. See J.D. Welsh and D. Viets, The 
Pretrial Offender in the District of Colum-
bia (District of Columbia Bail Agen-
cy/Office of Criminal Justice Plans and 
Analysis, Washington, D.C. 1977). 
The Metropolitan Police Department of 
the District is entitled to exercise con-
siderable police power through this 
statute, which provides congressional as-
sent to law enforcement activities 
designed to pursue the "legitimate na-
tional, state, and community interest in 
maintaining a decent society." See United 
States v. Moses, 339 A.2d 46, 54 
(D.C.App., 1975). 
The District of Columbia Court of Ap-
peals recently found the opportunity to 
consider this statute again in reviewing 
the conviction of Diane Dinkins. Dinkins 
v. United States, 374 A.2d 292 (D.C. 
App., 1977). In affirming this conviction, 
the court, sitting en bane, arrived at a 
construction of the statute which 
broadens considerably its reach and which 
some have found to be outrageous. 
Diane Dinkins was standing on a corner 
in Washington, nattily attired in a red 
sweater, blue miniskirt, and knee length 
boots. Obviously impressed by Diane's 
sartorial display, a plain clothes police 
officer who had been cruising the area in 
his private car pulled near the sidewalk 
where Ms. Dinkins was standing. The 
officer rolled down his window and said 
"Hi" to Ms. Dinkins, who thereupon ap-
proached the car. A conversation ensued 
which consisted of typically loaded ques-
tions from the police officer and typically 
suggestive responses from Ms. Dinkins. 
The officer first asked how much the 
lady's services would be, and when Ms. 
Dinkins finally became explicit as to her 
repertoire, she was arrested. After her 
conviction in a bench trial, she appealed 
to the District of Columbia Court of Ap-
peals. A division of this court decided to 
reverse the conviction. After the panel's 
opinion wa~ circulated to the other judges 
on the court, the usual practice, a rehear-
ing en bane was scheduled, and the full 
court affirmed. 
The appellant claimed that "no solic-
titation [was] made for prostitution since 
Miss Dinkins conduct was responsive ... 
rather than [initiatory]." 374 A.2d at 
295. 
The court disagreed, and in analyzing 
the wording of the statute noted that the 
word solicif does not specifically appear 
and thus its directive-active connotation 
as a gravamen of the offense was not ap-
plicable to §22-2701. 374 A.2d at 295. 
Instead, the court indicated (after research 
in Webster's Third New International Dic-
tionary) that words such as "entice" and 
"address" which are present in §22-2701 
can describe conduct which is not neces-
sarily active nor initiative in tenor. 
Through this analysis, which rivals the 
medieval philosophical speculation of the 
number of angels on the head of a pin, 
conduct which is responsive and even 
passive in reaction to a reasonably clever 
police officer can be proscribed by law. 
The court stated its conclusion as 
follows: 
We hold that appellant's attire, her 
prolonged presence on the street cor-
ner, her approach to a complete 
stranger, her extremely suggestive ver-
bal responses to the officer, her prompt 
discussion of financial terms, and her 
ready arrangement for a room are 
legally sufficient, when taken together, 
for a fact finder to conclude guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 374 A.2d 
at 296. 
The dissenting opinions noted that the 
Court of Appeals has interpreted the law 
as a solicitation statute. Id. at 297. The 
gist of the dissent was that "it must be 
affirmatively demonstrated that [she] in-
vited, enticed, persuaded, or addressed 
. . . for purposes of prostitution." Id. at 
298 (emphasis in original). The minority 
indicated that the police officer's remarks 
themselves could well be taken to con-
stitute violations of §22-2701. Id. 
The second dissenting opinion stated: 
I had always thought that if a prostitute 
is merely standing on a corner she may 
not be convicted of [a violation] of this 
statute simply because she is a prosti-
tute. Only if she solicits for prostitution 
may a conviction follow. I would have 
thought a construction of the statute 
was that simple, but now it seems that 
it is not. 374 A.2d at 299. 
Don't Count 
Your Tuition 
Before You're 
Billed 
by John Jeffrey Ross 
In Basch v. George Washington Univer-
sity, 370 A.2d 1364 (D.C.App., 1977), 
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals 
considered a claim by plaintiff medical 
students that the defendant university 
breached its contract with them by charg-
ing tuition increases far exceeding those 
listed in the medical school bulletin. 
The George Washington University 
Bulletin: School of Medicine and Health 
Sciences, published for the 1974-1975 
year, listed estimated tuition increases of 
approximately $200.00 per year over the 
base tuition of $3200.00 for 1974-1975. 
Many students, according to ap-
pellants/plaintiffs, contended that their 
decision to attend George Washington 
was influenced by these estimated costs. 
When the university issued a "Statement 
of Tuition Rates" in January, 1975, 
revealing tuition costs far in excess of 
those outlined as estimates by the 
bulletin, the students complained in a suit 
in D.C. Superior Court. Treating a defen-
dant's motion to dismiss as one for sum-
mary judgment, the trial court found that 
as a matter of law the students were not 
entitled to relief. The case was taken to 
the Court of Appeals . 
The issue before the court was whether 
the university was to be contractually 
bound to projected tuition increases. The 
appellants renewed their claim that it was. 
Considering the fact that medical school 
tuition costs in the District have reached, 
or will reach $12,000 per year at George 
Washington and Georgetown universities, 
this claim on the part of the students was 
certainly an urgent one. 
The court began its discussion by not-
ing the general rule that terms set down in 
a university bulletin can become part of 
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